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I INTRODUCTION 
The Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009, in 
conjunction with the Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang 
Insignia) Bylaw 2009, prohibits the display of gang insignia in specified 
places in the Wanganui district. This prohibition seeks to remedy the harms 
of public intimidation and violent gang confrontation. However, the need 
for this remedy is questionable because the extent of these harms is unclear 
and the pre-existing statutory framework already addressed these harms. 
The prohibition limits the freedom of people to express membership, 
support or affiliation in respect of the gangs listed in the Act and Bylaw. 
The prohibition therefore comes into conflict with the right to freedom of 
expression. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the BORA) protects the right to 
freedom of expression and prescribes how the right may be limited or 
disregarded. Applying section 5, it is argued that the display of gang 
insignia falls within the scope of expression protected by the BORA, but 
that the natural and intended meaning of the prohibition of the display of 
gang insignia unjustifiably limits the right to freedom of expression. While 
the purposes of the prohibition are sufficiently important to warrant limiting 
the right to freedom of expression, the prohibition is not rationally or 
proportionately connected to these purposes. Essentially, the prohibition is 
too broad because it prohibits the display of gang insignia that neither 
intimidates nor increases the likelihood of violent gang confrontation. 
Under section 6 of the BORA, an alternative meaning can arguably be 
given to the prohibition that is more consistent with the freedom of 
expression and better respects the purposes of the prohibition. Under this 
meaning the prohibition would only apply to the display of gang insignia 
that intimidates or promotes violent gang confrontation. It is even arguable 
that it is tenable, under section 6, to interpret the prohibition to only apply 
to the display of gang insignia that is intended to intimidate or promote 
violent gang confrontation. 
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However, this author argues that it is simply not tenable to interpret the 
prohibition in either of these ways. Parliament has clearly decided that all 
display of gang insignia within the specified areas is to be prohibited. It is 
irrelevant whether such display does, in fact, intimidate or promote violent 
gang confrontation, because Parliament has deemed this to be the case. 
The prohibition cannot be given a more BORA-consistent meaning under 
section 6. Therefore, according to section 4, the prohibition must be 
enforced as applying to all display of gang insignia in the specified places, 
even though it represents and unjustified limitation under section 5. 
II WANGANUI DISTRICT COUNCIL (PROHIBITION OF GANG 
INSIGNIA) ACT 2009 
The Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009 
(the PGI Act) came into force on the 10 May 2009. It prohibits the display 
of gang insignia in specified public places in the Wanganui district. 
However, for the prohibition to be enforceable the PGI Act required the 
Wanganui District Council (the Council) to make a bylaw specifying the 
public places where the prohibition shall apply. 1 The Council has passed 
the Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bylaw 2009 
(the PGI Bylaw), which specifies that the prohibition of the display of gang 
insignia applies to all the public places in the Wanganui district urban area 
as well as the general public area at Mowhanau Beach and Village, and 
rural halls. 2 The PGI Bylaw also included the Red Devils, Head Hunters, 
and Manga Kahu as gangs subject to the prohibition. 3 The PGI Bylaw 
came into force on 1 September 2009.4 Therefore, the prohibition of the 
display of gang insignia has been in force since 1 September 2009. 
1 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009, ss 4,5, & 12. 
2 Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bylaw 2009, s3 . 
3 lbid, s 2. 
4 lbid. 
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A Purpose 
Disappointingly for a statute lacking complexity, the PGI Act does not 
clearly express a purpose. Section 3 of the PGI Act is titled "purpose", but 
unhelpfully only divulges that the purpose of the PGI Act is to "prohibit the 
display of gang insignia in specified places" within the district of the 
Wanganui District Council. 5 Section 3 merely states what the PGI Act 
does, not what harm it seeks to remedy. 
However, the purpose can be inferred from the PGI Act itself. Section 5 ( 1) 
of the PGI Act confers upon the Council the power to make bylaws 
determining which gangs are prohibited from displaying their gang insignia 
and where this prohibition exists. This power of the Council is limited by 
the requirement of section 5 (5) that such bylaws must be "reasonably 
necessary in order to prevent or reduce the likelihood of intimidation or 
harassment of members of the public in a specified place or to avoid or 
reduce the potential for confrontation by or between gangs. "6 
Therefore, the twin purposes of the Wanganui prohibition, according to the 
legislation, are to prevent or reduce the intimidation of members of the 
public and to avoid or reduce gang confrontation. 7 
The purposes of the PGI Act, as understood during its passage through 
Parliament, changed. The PGI Bill was introduced to Parliament to reduce 
the occurrence of gang confrontation, which was seen to cause members of 
the public to feel intimidated. 8 It therefore sought to reduce both the 
occurrence gang confrontations and public intimidation. However, during 
5 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009, s 3. 
6 lbid, s 5(5). 
7 
See Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill 2007, no 171-1 
(Explanatory Note) ; Draft Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) 
Bylaw 2009 (Statement of Proposal); Report of the Attorney-General under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang 
Insignia) Bill (20 February 2008). 
8 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill 2007, no 171-1 
(Explanatory Note); (2 April 2008) 646 NZPD 15338. 
6 
the Committee of the Whole House, Chester Borrows, the Member of 
Parliament responsible for the PGI Bill, stated that the "legislation is trying 
to deal to one particular issue, and that is the intimidation that people feel 
when they are surrounded by patched gang members."9 
It is unclear whether Mr Borrows is here ignoring the reduction or 
avoidance of gang confrontation as a purpose of the W anganui prohibition. 
It is possible that "dealing to intimidation" may involve addressing both 
intimidation of members of the public and confrontations by, or between, 
gangs. However, the uncertainty over whether the purpose is to target 
public intimidation or to target both public intimidation and gang 
confrontation reflects a disjuncture between the perceived harm and the 
proposed remedy.10 During the third reading of the PGI Bill Mr Borrows 
reinforced this narrow view of the PGI Bill ' s purpose: 11 
It is targeted at the intimidatory nature of wearing and displaying gang insignia. 
It is not an attempt to outlaw gangs, stop gang offending, or bring about world 
peace; it is a narrowly focused instrument to stop intimidation by virtue of the 
display of gang insignia - that is it. 
The lack of a clearly articulated purpose is significant for the issue, under 
section 5 of the BORA, of whether the Wanganui prohibition justifiably 
limits the right to freedom of expression. 
B Definitions 
Section 4 of the PGI Act defines "gang" and "gang insignia": 
gang means-
(a) Black Power, Hells Angels, Magogs, Mothers, Mongrel Mob, Nomads, or 
Tribesmen; and 
(b) any other specified organisation, association, or group of persons 
identified in a bylaw made under section 5 
9 (25 March 2009) 653 NZPD 2088 . 
'
0 
See below (IV D 3) for discussion of the lack of rational connection between the 
Wanganui prohibition ' s purposes and its measures . 
11 (6 May 2009) 654 ZPD 2945. 
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gang insignia-
( a) means a sign, symbol, or representation commonly displayed to denote 
membership of, an affiliation with, or support for a gang, not being tattoos; 
and 
(b) includes any item of clothing to which a sign, symbol, or representation 
referred to in paragraph (a) is attached 
The PGI Bylaw included the Red Devils, Head Hunters, and Manga Kahu 
as gangs for the purposes of the PGI Act. 12 
It is uncertain how these definitions will be interpreted and applied. First, 
uncertainty surrounds the readiness to include or exclude groups, 
organisations or associations in the definition of "gang".13 Second, the 
extent of the definition of "gang insignia" is uncertain. For example, it is 
possible that a red hooded shirt, 14 or yellow t-shirt, 15 may fall within the 
definition of gang insignia. Third, consistency in the interpretation of what 
constitutes "gang insignia" is a potential issue. 16 A more thorough 
consideration of these issues is outside the focus of this paper. However, 
12 Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bylaw 2009, s 2. 
13 Section 5 (4) of the Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009 
states that [t]he Council must not make a by law identifying a gang under subsection (1 )(b) 
unless it is satisfied that the organisation, association, or group proposed to be identified 
has the following characteristics : 
(a) a common name or common identifying signs, symbols, or representations; 
and 
(b) its members, associates, or supporters individually or collectively promote, 
encourage, or engage in a pattern of criminal activity. 
However, see (25 March 2009) 653 NZPD 2104-2113 ; Draft Wanganui District Council 
(Prohibition of Gang Insignia) By law 2009 (Statement of Proposal); Wanganui District 
Council "Minutes of Extraordinary Meeting of the Wanganui District Council" (22 May 
2009) 1956-1957 <www.wanganui.govt.nz> (last accessed 9 July 2009) for lack of 
discussion regarding common identification, patterns of criminal activity, or reasonable 
necessity of including those listed as gangs. 
14 On 25 September 2008 Paul Kumeroa was assaulted by Black Power members and later 
died of head injuries. Mr Kumeroa was not associated with or affiliated to any gang but 
was wearing a red hooded sweatshirt: " ... clothes that were the wrong colour that night and 
... associated him with the rival gang." See "Gang Rivalry May Have Played Part in 
Kumeroa Killing" (22 November 2008) Wanganui Chronicle Wanganui 
<http ://www.wanganuichronicle.co.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009) . 
15 Jordan Herewini was run over twice by Mongrel Mob members and died. Mr Herewini 
"had earlier been in a scuffle with Mongrel Mob members over his yellow T-shirt, as the 
colour is associated with the local - rival - Tribesmen gang." See Alanah May Eriksen 
"Teen Killed Over T-shirt Colour, Say Residents" (29 January 2009) The New Zealand 
Herald <http ://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009). 
16 Metiria Turei MP ( 4 March 2009) 652 NZPD 1650-1652. 
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they are raised to show, if nothing else, potential issues in the application of 
the prohibition that relate to the scope of the PGI Act and its impact on the 
freedom of expression. 
C Prohibition of the display of gang insignia 
Section 12 of the PGI Act establishes the offence of displaying gang 
insignia in specified places. It states: 
(1) No person may display gang insignia at any time in a specified place in the 
district. 
(2) Every person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection ( 1) 
commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
$2,000. 
(3) Without limitation, and to avoid doubt, a Judge may apply section 128 of the 
Evidence Act 2006 in deciding whether a sign, symbol, or representation is gang 
insignia for the purposes of this Act. 
It is therefore an offence to display, in any public place specified in the PGI 
Bylaw, any sign, symbol, or representation, not being tattoos, commonly 
displayed to denote membership of, an affiliation with, or support for any 
gang listed in the PGI Act or Bylaw. 
D Enforcement 
The Police are responsible for enforcing the PGI Act and Bylaw. A 
constable may, without warrant, arrest any person reasonably suspected of 
displaying gang insignia in a specified place. A constable may also seize 
the gang insignia, using force if necessary. 17 Furthermore, any seized gang 
insignia is forfeited to the Crown if the arrested person pleads guilty to, or 
is convicted of, an offence under section 12.
18 
17 Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009, s 13(1). 
18 Ibid, s 13(2). 
9 
A constable may, without warrant, stop a vehicle to exercise the above 
powers of arrest and seizure. 19 
E Summary 
The PGI Act and Bylaw are a response to the perceived problem of gang 
confrontation and public intimidation in Wanganui . According to the 
Council, the display of gang insignia is: 20 
the principal means of identifying the members or associates of different gangs 
and contributes to, and is likely to promote, further gang confrontations. 
Members of the public are intimidated by gang members congregating in public 
places and wearing gang insignia. 
The assumption underlying the PGI Act and Bylaw is that by removing the 
public display of gang insignia the potential for gang confrontation and 
public intimidation is removed or reduced. 
The following section steps back and examines the extent of these harms 
and the need for the Wanganui prohibition as a remedy. 
III SETTING THE SCENE 
A Wanganui's Gang Problem 
On 28 February 2006 a violent confrontation took place at a suburban 
Wanganui petrol station between members of the Hells Angels and Mongrel 
Mob gangs. In response, Wanganui Mayor Michael Laws declared that 
Wanganui "will not be intimidated by the gang violence that erupted in the 
19 Ibid, s 14. 
20 Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill 2007, no 171-1 
(Explanatory Note) . 
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city today."21 This comment highlights the dual aspect of the harm caused 
by gangs: violent confrontations and intimidation of members of the public. 
1 Violent gang confrontation 
W anganui has a problem of gang offending. Police statistics show that in 
the three years 2004-2006 gangs committed 350 offences in Wanganui, 76 
of which were defined as "gang clashes".
22 Furthermore, gang-related 
offending is on the rise. In 2004, gangs committed 77 offences in 
Wanganui. In 2005, the number of gang-related offences rose to 82 . In 
2006, the number of gang-related offences jumped to 191. The number of 
violent confrontations by, or between, gangs in public places is also 
increasing. In 2004, 11 such incidents occurred. In 2005 , 17 incidents 
occurred. And in 2006, the number of incidents of violent gang 
confrontation alarmingly rose to 48.
23 
Examples of gang-related incidents include an unprovoked assault in a 
courthouse involving members of opposing gangs; death threats; and shots 
fired at rival gang members, their houses, and cars. 
24 Many of the offences 
occurred in public places such as petrol stations, parking lots, and 
courthouses and involved weapons such as baseball bats, knives, guns and 
tomahawks. 25 More recent examples of gang-related incidents include the 
drive by shooting of 2 year old Jhia Te Tua,26 and the assault and death of 
non-gang member Paul Kumeroa27 . 
21 Wanganui District Council "Wanganui will not be intimidated: Mayor backs Police 
action" (28 February 2006) Press Release <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 5 July 
2009) . 
22 "Gang OIA - Response" (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to 
Area Commander, Wanganui Police, New Zealand Police) <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last 
accessed 1 October 2009). Note that domestic violence offences that did not spill into the 
public arena; search warrants and traffic related offences that did not include a public 
safety interest; and offences in prison were excluded from the statistics. 
23 "Gang OIA - Response", above n 22 ; Wanganui District Council "Gang Offending 
Shows Need for Patch Ban" (3 April 2007) Press Release <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last 
accessed 2 July 2009) . 
24 Ibid, Appendix A. 
25 Ibid. 
26 "Trial into Murder of Jhia Te Tua Begins" ( 10 November 2008) Th e New Zealand 
Herald <http://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009). 
27 "Gang Rivalry May Have Played Part in Kumeroa Killing", above n 14. 
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Despite this picture of gang violence in Wanganui, the police statistics are 
misleading. The main offences committed by gang members in the three 
year period 2004-2006 were dishonesty, and drug and anti-social 
offences. 28 Dishonesty offences account for nearly 40 per cent of the total 
gang-related offences. 
The 76 incidents of gang clashes, so often referred to by proponents of the 
gang insignia ban,29 include instances of mere possession of an offensive 
weapon; drug possession; consumption of alcohol in breach of liquor ban; 
and gang presence in the central business district. 30 These incidents were 
not necessarily ancillary to violent gang confrontations and when included 
as such, distort the statistics by suggesting greater occurrence of gang 
violence than is the reality.31 Of the 76 incidents of gang clashes only 22 
involved physical altercations or shots from firearms. A further 15 
involved incidents of aggression or confrontation, such as verbal 
altercations, that did not result in physical altercations.32 
Furthermore, the statistics provided by the police are not concerned with the 
presence or absence of gang insignia. Rather, the focus of the police 
statistics was the "number, frequency and magnitude of gang clashes in 
Wanganui. "33 Therefore, even if the police statistics do show a problem of 
violent gang confrontations, they do not show a clear connection between 
the occurrence of violence and the display of gang insignia. 
28 "Gang OIA - Response", above n 22 . 
29 Chester Borrows (4 March 2009) 652 NZPD 1644; Wanganui District Council "Gang 
Offending Shows Need for Patch Ban" (3 April 2007) Press Release 
<www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009); Wanganui District Council 
(Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill 2007, no 171-1 (Explanatory Note). 
30 "Gang OIA - Response", above n 22, Appendix A. 
31 Cr Vincent claimed that out of600 gang related incidents over 4 year period only 7 
occurred in the central business district, and of those 7 incidents, 3 occurred on the same 
day by the same 2 people. Rob Vincent, Wanganui City Councillor "Wanganui Gang 
Patch Law" (Nine to Noon, 7 May 2009) Radio New Zealand National 
<www.radionz.co.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009). 
32 "Gang OIA - Response", above n 22 . 
33 "Gang OIA - Response", above n 22. 
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2 Public intimidation 
The second aspect of harm caused by gangs is the intimidation of members 
of the public by gang members. This harm is a consequence of the violent 
gang confrontations. Because gangs are known to be violent, the mere 
presence of a gang member may intimidate. The display of gang insignia 
increases the ability to identify gang members, and therefore, increases the 
ability of gang members to intimidate:34 
... when a Black Power or Mongrel Mob patch is put on those individuals, they 
become to the observer the manifestation of all the publicity in respect of criminal 
offending by that gang. Just by wearing that patch they become, in the eyes of the 
onlooker, rapists, murderers, assailants, or random killers who are likely to break 
into spontaneous violence at any stage. That is the history of the Mongrel Mob, 
Black Power, and Hell ' s Angels. Those gangs exploit that record. They exploit 
that history, they publicise it, and they honour and applaud it, and that is 
intimidating. The intimidation is directly tied to the recognition of the insignia 
and all that it represents. The display and wearing of the gang patch creates that 
intimidation ... 
This argument is that the mere display of gang insignia intimidates 
regardless of whether the displayer is behaving in an intimidatory way or 
not. 35 Gang insignia categorically declares gang membership and therefore 
bestows upon the displayer the gang's violent, criminal history of the public 
conscience. Accordingly, the mere display of gang insignia intimidates 
regardless of the displayer's behaviour due to the violent history the gang 
insignia represents. 
One problem with this argument is that the violent and intimidating history 
is bestowed due to gang embers' prev10us violent and intimidating 
behaviour not the display of gang ms1gnia. While it may increase 
intimidation, the display of gang insignia does not create intimidation. The 
34 (6 May 2009) 654 NZPD 2945. 
35 (6 May 2009) 654 NZPD 2945.See also Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Wanganui District Council" (10 March 2006) 
1861 <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 7 July 2009) . 
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display of gang insignia is therefore a supplement to, rather than a cause of, 
intimidation. 
In the Youth Survey Wanganui 2005, 49 per cent of youth listed 
intimidation by gang members as the "single-biggest threat to their feeling 
safe in their own community" and biggest negative feature of Wanganui.36 
Commenting on the survey's findings, Mayor Laws said that the "gang 
culture in Wanganui intimidated Wanganui people especially youth," and 
that there is "no question that the Wanganui community was intimidated by 
patched gang members."37 
However, no further evidence is offered to support the claim that members 
of the public are intimidated by the display of gang insignia. It is simply 
assumed that because gang members are violent, or at least are portrayed 
and understood to be such, the public is intimidated by their presence and 
that the display of gang insignia plays an important part in this intimidation. 
In Wanganui Referendum 07 nearly two-thirds of voters responded in 
favour of a ban of the wearing of gang insignia in public places.38 This 
response does not necessarily evidence that the public is intimidated by the 
display of gang insignia. It may simply be that those who voted disapprove 
of, or dislike, gang members. It is probable that members of the public are, 
at least sometimes, intimidated by gang members. However, it is far from 
certain that the display of gang insignia plays a significant role in this 
intimidation. 
36 (6 May 2009) 654 NZPD 2945. See also (25 March 2009) 653 NZPD 2090; Wanganui 
District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Strategy Committee" (23 March 2006) 
2016 <www.wanganui.govt.nz> (last accessed 5 July 2009). 
37 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Strategy Committee", above 
n 36, 2016. 
38 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Wanganui District Council" 
(30 April 2007) 3536 <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009). 
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B The Wanganui District Council's Response 
On 10 March 2006 the W anganui District Council held an extraordinary 
meeting to address the rise in gang-related offences. The Council agreed to 
draft a "bylaw to ban gang regalia and colours from the Central Business 
District, and all other public places, in the Wanganui District."
39 While the 
problem to be addressed by the proposed bylaw was not made explicit, the 
Council's debate centered on two issues: violent gang confrontations and 
intimidation of members of the public. It was argued that the ban would 
remove the "sphere of intimidation" created by patched gang members 
"strutting around the streets" and allow people to feel safer on the streets.
40 
However, the Council did not explain how banning gang regalia would 
address violent gang confrontations.41 
Following concern over the consistency of the bylaw with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 the Council decided to pursue the proposed ban as a 
local Bill.42 However, the Council first sought to measure the community's 
support for the proposed ban. 43 The question of whether "Wanganui 
[ should] introduce a local bill that outlaws the wearing of gang insignia in 
public places?" was put forward in the local referendum of April 2007.
44 
Of the nearly 48 per cent of electors that voted, 64.62 per cent voted in 
favour, while 31.73 per cent voted against.45 According to Mayor Michael 
Laws, a ban on gang regalia would " ... send a simple message: gangs are 
not welcome in Wanganui. "46 
39 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Wanganui 
District Council" (10 March 2006), above n 35, 1864. 
40 Ibid, 1862-1863. 
41 The ban on gang-patches was expressed as removing intimidation not gang 
confrontation. See, for example, ibid, 1863 . 
42 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Wanganui District Council" 
(26 February 2007) 3280-3281 <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009); 
"Crime Stats Show Gangs a Serious Problem Here, Says Laws" (4 April 2007) Wanganui 
Chronicle Wanganui <http://www.wanganuichronicle.co.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009). 
43 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Wanganui District Council" 
(26 February 2007), above n 42, 3280-3281 . 
44 Wanganui Referendum 07 "Gang Insignia Bill" <www.wanganuireferendum.govt.nz> 
(last accessed 2 July 2009) . 
45 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Wanganui District Council" 
(30 April 2007) 3536 <www.wanganui.govt.nz> (last accessed 2 July 2009). 
46 Wanganui District Council "Gang Offending Shows Need for Patch Ban", above n 29. 
15 
On 22 November 2007 the Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang 
Insignia) Bill was introduced to Parliament as a "new tool to ... reduce the 
likelihood of confrontation between gang members by enabling Council to 
prohibit wearing or displaying of gang insignia in specified places in the 
district."47 Such a prohibition was seen to address both the incidence of 
gang confrontation and also the intimidation of members of public by gang 
members. 
C Existing Statutory Framework 
While not targeting gangs specifically, the existing statutory framework 
already addresses the perceived harms, caused by gangs of, of public 
intimidation and violent gang confrontations. Indeed, these perceived 
harms are based on police statistics of criminal offending. Therefore, the 
perceived harms to be remedied are necessarily already covered by criminal 
offences. 
1 Summary Offences Act 1981 
The Summary Offences Act 1981 establishes offences that address the gang 
problem in Wanganui. The Act criminalizes both violent confrontations 
and public intimidation. It is an offence to assault another person,48 fight in 
public,49 associate with violent offenders,50 and behave, or incite another to 
behave, in a disorderly manner in a public place. 51
 Therefore, legislation 
already exists addressing, and prohibiting, the harm of gang confrontation. 
The Summary Offences Act 1981 also establishes offences addressing 
public intimidation. Section 21 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 creates 
an offence of intimidation. The offence requires intent to intimidate or 
47 Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill 2007, no 171-1 
(Explanatory Note). 
48 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 9. 
49 Ibid s 7 
50 Ibict: s 6A. 
5 1 Summary Offences Act 1981 , s 3. 
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frighten, or knowledge that the conduct is likely to cause the other person 
reasonably to be frightened or intimidated. Behaviour that intimidates but 
that is not accompanied by an intent to intimidate does not establish the 
offence. 52 Furthermore, the offence addresses behaviour aimed at a 
particular person. 53 Therefore, the display of gang insignia is already an 
offence under section 21 where the displayer intends to, or is reckless as to 
whether his or her conduct does, intimidate a particular person or group. 
The offence of common assault under section 9 includes:
54 
threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force to the person of another, if 
the person making the threat has, or causes the other person to believe on 
reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose 
While this offence captures public intimidation by the use of threats, it does 
not capture the mere display of gang insignia. A threat may be made by 
"any act or gesture". However, it would stretch the definition to hold that 
the mere display of gang insignia constitutes a threat to apply force and 
provides reasonable grounds to believe that a threat will be carried out. 
Under section 4 the use of offensive language in public places is an 
offence.55 This offence covers public intimidation by the use of offensive 
language. The offensive language does not have to be addressed to a 
particular person. 56 However, for the purposes of this offence, the display 
of gang insignia does not constitute language and so is not, in itself, caught 
by the offence. 
These offences reqmre offensive behaviour, threats to apply force, of 
intention or reckless intention directed at a particular person. Therefore, 
absent such conduct and intention, the Summary Offences Act 1981 does 
52 R v Brooker (2004) 22 CRNZ 162, para 5 (CA) William Young J for the Court. 
53 Under Section 21 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 every person commits an offence 
who, with intent to frighten or intimidate any other person, or knowing that his or her 
conduct is likely to cause that other person reasonably to be frightened or intimidated: 
threatens to injure; follows ; stops, confronts, or accosts in a public place; that other person. 
54 Summary Offences Act 1981 , s 2(1) . 
55 Ibid, s 4. 
56 Ibid, S 4(1 )( C ). 
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not address the intimidation of members of public caused by the mere 
display of gang insignia. 
The Summary Offences Act 1981 creates offences for intimidating 
behaviour but not for the mere display of gang insignia. This does not 
suggest that the mere display of gang insignia is a harm in need of remedy. 
Rather, it suggests that such remedy is neither necessary nor desirable. 
Prohibiting the display of gang insignia does not address a harm to 
remedied. The harm of public intimidation is already remedied by the 
Summary Offences Act 1981 . The residual behaviour that the prohibition 
covers, the mere display of gang insignia, should not attract sanction. The 
mere display of gang insignia lacks both an element of intention and the 
required level of offensiveness to warrant criminal sanction. 57 
2 Court orders 
Court orders are used to prevent further gang confrontations by targeting 
known, or suspected, offenders. Under section 112 of the Sentencing Act 
2002 the court may make a non-association order where an offender is 
convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment. A non-association 
order prohibits the offender from associating with a specified person or 
class of persons. The court must be satisfied that the making of a non-
association order is reasonably necessary in order to prevent the offender 
from committing further offences punishable by imprisonment. 58 
Under section 31 of the Bail Act 2000 the court may impose any condition 
on the release of a defendant that it considers is reasonably necessary to 
ensure that the defendant does not commit any offence while on bail. 
Similarly, the Parole Act 2002 allows for the imposition of any' condition 
on an offenders parole release. 59 Such conditions include non-association 
orders and orders prohibiting the display of gang insignia. 
57 See Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 , paras 41-4 7 (SC) Elias CJ. 
58 Sentencing Act 2002, s 112(2). 
59 Parole Act 2002, s 15(3 )( c ). 
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In June 2009 six Nomads gang members were arrested over violent 
incidents following the death of the Nomads' leader. While five of the men 
were remanded in custody the sixth was remanded on bail with orders not 
to wear gang insignia or associate with other members of the Nomads 
gang.60 
This example suggests that prohibiting the display of gang insignia may be 
useful to reduce the likelihood of violent gang confrontations in a particular 
case. However, such prohibitions can only be imposed as a condition of 
release on parole or bail and so only enforceable against a known, or 
suspected, offender. It does not necessarily follow that a general 
prohibition of the display of gang insignia is required to prevent violent 
gang confrontations. A prohibition as part of a court order relates to a 
particular person, having regard to the particular situation. A general 
prohibition, on the other hand, applies to all displayers of gang insignia 
regardless of whether such display would likely lead to violent gang 
confrontations. Therefore, while it may be appropriate in a particular case 
to prohibit the display of gang insignia by a person as a condition of a court 
order, it does not follow that a general prohibition of the display of gang 
insignia is appropriate. 
D Previous Recommendations for Tackling the Gang Problem 
A prohibition of the display of gang insignia has not previously been 
recommended. In 1981 a committee on gangs was established to analyse 
the existing gang situation in New Zealand and recommend the 
establishment of new, or modifications to existing, programmes, practices 
and policies.
61 While the Committee did not object to young people 
meeting together, it did reject "gang behaviour that results in violence, 
60 "Gang Man Hurls Abuse at Judge" (3 July 2009) The Dominion Post, A7. 
61 New Zealand Committee on Gangs "Report of the Committee on Gangs" (Wellington, 
April 1981) (i). 
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territorial disputes and intimidation."62 The Committee defined a gang as a 
peer group association distinguished from other groups by the "display of 
overt violent behaviour or acts of intimidation."63 The Committee 
recommended greater use of non-association orders in probation, alternative 
sentencing measures, preventive programmes, and a review of the law 
concerning unlawful assembly and riot. 64 However, regarding gang 
insignia, the Committee made no recommendation but instead commented 
that "[t]o consider the issue of the manner of dress of gang members ... is 
fraught with difficulties and is likely to be counterproductive."65 
Therefore, while the committee was concerned by the violence and 
intimidation caused by gangs, it preferred to address these concerns through 
strengthening existing practices rather than introducing a prohibition of the 
display of gang insignia, which it did not see as helpful. 
In 1988 the Human Rights Commission expressed concern over proposed 
criminal provisions which would address behaviour and circumstances 
already covered by existing law.66 The proposed section 5A of the 
Disorderly Assemblies and Restrictions on Association Bill 1988 was 
designed to "tackle the intimidating presence of people who congregate in 
public places to the alarm of other members of the public ... [and] so 
conduct themselves, or assemble in such a way, as to cause a person in the 
immediate vicinity to be fearful, on reasonable grounds, of the likelihood of 
violence or disorderly behaviour."67 However, due to the broad range of 
behaviour already prohibited by the Summary Offences Act 1981 the 
Commission questioned the need for the new provision.68 Furthermore, the 
implications of the proposed section 5A for freedom of peaceful assembly, 
discrimination based on the grounds of race, and freedom of expression 
62 lbid, 4. 
63 Ibid, 1 & 4. 
64 Ibid, 41-44. 
65 Ibid, 37. 
66 New Zealand Human Rights Commission "Disorderly Assemblies and Restrictions on 
Association Bill 1988: Report by the Human Rights Commission under Section 6(1)(c) of 
the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 to the Prime Minister" (July 1988). 
67 Ibid, 4. 
68 Ibid, 4-5 . 
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"override the value of any small increase in Police powers to deal with the 
"gang problem". "69 
Therefore, even though the proposed prov1s10n may have reduced 
intimidation it was not seen to be such a significant gain, in light of existing 
measures, to warrant infringing fundamental rights. Significantly, since the 
Commission's report the New Zealand Parliament has enacted a Bill of 
Rights that affirms New Zealand's commitment to upholding and protecting 
those fundamental rights. 
The W anganui prohibition provides only a small increase in Police powers 
to deal with the problem of intimidation and confrontation involving gang 
members. Statutory offences already exist that cover these problems. Due 
to the existence of the BORA, the reasoning of the Human Rights 
Commission that fundamental freedoms should not lightly be overridden is 
even more pertinent. 
The following section considers whether the PGI Act and Bylaw limits the 
right to freedom of expression contained in the (BORA), 70 and if so 
whether this limitation is justified. 
IV NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the BORA) affirms the rights 
and freedoms, including the right to the freedom of expression, contained in 
Part 2 of that Act.71 These rights are protected by the interrelated 
provisions of sections 4, 5 and 6. 
69 Ibid, 8. 
70 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
7 1 Ibid, s 2. 
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A The Application of Sections 4, 5, and 6 
Sections 4, 5 and 6 do not prescribe a clear approach for determining 
whether an enactment is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained 
in the BORA. 72 
Section 4 recognises Parliament's plenary law making power by providing 
that an enactment shall not be "in any way invalid or ineffective" simply 
because it is inconsistent with a right or freedom contained in the BORA. 
Therefore, in New Zealand the fundamental rights contained in the BORA 
do not constitute superior law and cannot be used to strike down 
inconsistent laws. 
However, subject to section 4, section 5 provides that: 
the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 
Section 6 requires that: 
[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights 
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to 
any other meaning. 
This paper adopts the approach suggested by the majority of the Supreme 
Court in the leading case of Hansen v R.73 The Hansen approach is 
favoured in cases where a provision is capable of having conceptually 
distinct meanings. 74 The Wanganui prohibition is capable of having three 
conceptually distinct meanings: all display of gang insignia is r,rohibited, 
the display of gang insignia that intimidates or promotes gang confrontation 
72 See Moonen v Film and literature Board of Review (No I) [2000] 2 NZLR 9, para 16 
(CA) Tipping J for the Court; Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (No 2) 
[2002] 2 NZLR 754, paras 14-15 (CA) Richardson P for the Court; Hansen v R [2007] 
NZSC 7; 3 NZLR 1, para 61 (SC) Blanchard J; paras 93-94 Tipping J; paras 191-192 
McGrath J. 
73 Hansen v R [2007], ibid. 
74 Ibid, para 94 (SC) Tipping J. 
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is prohibited, the display of gang insignia done with intent to intimidate or 
promote gang confrontation is prohibited. The Court of Appeal 
recommended a different approach in Moonen v Film and Literature Board 
of Review (No 1).75 However, the prohibition of the display of gang 
insignia is not like the prov1s1on in Moonen (No 1), which was 
"conceptually elastic and therefore intrinsically capable of having a 
meaning which impinged more or less on freedom of expression."
76 
The Hansen approach can be summarised as follows: 77 first, ascertain the 
natural meaning of the provision. Second, ascertain whether there is an 
"apparent inconsistency"78 between this meaning and a BORA right or 
freedom. If there is an "apparent inconsistency", ascertain whether the 
limitation is justified in terms of section 5. If it is justified, the "meaning is 
not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights in the sense envisaged by section 6, 
and should be adopted by the court."79 If the limitation is not justified 
under section 5, then, the fourth step is to apply section 6 and determine 
whether a "consistent or more consistent meaning is reasonably possible."80 
If such a meaning is tenable, it should be adopted. If a consistent or more 
consistent meaning is not tenable, then, due to section 4, the natural 
meaning must be adopted even though it presents an unjustified limitation 
on the relevant BORA right or freedom. 
Applying this approach, the following sections analyse the relationship 
between the prohibition of the display of gang insignia and the right to 
freedom of expression contained in the BORA. 
75 Moonen v Film and literature Board of Review (No /) , above n 72. 
76 Hansen v R, above n 72, para 93 (SC) Tipping J. 
77 Ibid, paras 57-60 Blanchard J; para 92 Tipping J; para 192 McGrath J. 
78 Ibid, para 89 Tipping J. 
79 Ibid, para 60 Blanchard J. 
80 Ibid, para 90 Tipping J. 
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B Natural Meaning of the Wanganui Prohibition 
The prohibition contained in the PGI Act is clearly stated: 81 
No person may display gang insignia at any time in a specified place in the 
district. 
The offence is satisfied by the mere display of gang insignia. The intention 
and purpose of the displayer is irrelevant. Therefore, the offence is one of 
strict liability and entails a blanket ban of the display of gang insignia. This 
view is supported by the powers of arrest and seizure under s 13, which 
allow a constable to arrest a person suspected of displaying gang insignia 
and/or seize the displayed gang insignia without warrant. 
The natural meamng 1s simply that all display of gang insignia 1s 
prohibited. 
C Apparent Inconsistency between the Wanganui Prohibition and 
the Right to Freedom of Expression 
To determine whether the natural meaning of the Wanganui prohibition is 
consistent with the right to freedom of expression it is necessary to first 
ascertain the scope of that right and then to consider whether the display of 
gang insignia falls within that scope. 
I The scope of freedom of expression 
The BORA affirms the right to freedom of expression.82 Section 14 states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart infom1ation and opinions of any kind in any form. 
8 1 The Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009, s 12. 
82 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 2. 
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The right is "as wide as human thought and imagination"
83
, and includes 
both verbal and non-verbal conduct
84
. The reference to "of any kind in any 
form" in section 14 indicates that no expressive act falls outside the ambit 
of section 14 of the BORA on the grounds of what is communicated or how 
it is communicated.
85 Furthermore, the use of the qualifier "including" 
indicates that the freedom of expression is not limited to the freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and opinions.
86 Rather than 
addressing limitations to the freedom of expression at the definitional stage, 
the approach favoured is to give the right to freedom of expression the 
widest interpretation possible. According to Butler and Butler, the "easier 
and more consistent approach is to address all limitations on s 14 of BORA 
through the rubric of s 5 of BORA."
87 Indeed the very existence of a 
general limitations provision suggests that the rights and freedoms 
contained in the BORA are to be defined widely and only limited through 
the general limitations provision. 
88 
The Canadian approach is that expression is any activity that conveys, or 
attempts to convey, a meaning. 
89 As the definition of freedom of 
expression in the BORA is non-exhaustive, conduct with an expressive 
content would be protected and this approach seems to have been adopted 
by the New Zealand courts.
90 
The display of gang insignia would, based on the above discussion, fall 
within the scope of freedom of expression protected by section 14 of the 
BORA. It has expressive content. It conveys the message that the 
displayer is a member of a particular group in society. It is integral to the 
83 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (No /), above n 72, para 15 (CA) 
Tipping J for the Court. 
84 Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704, para 41 (HC). 
85 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentary 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) 310. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, 316. The justified limitation provision of s 5 BORA suggests that the scope o
f 
freedom of expression should not be defined to include limitations. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General (Quebec) [ 1989] 1 SCR 927, para 42 (SCC) Dickso
n 
CJ, Lamer and Wilson JJ. 
90 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, above n 85 , 312-314. 
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member's affirmation of identity and therefore important for individual 
self-fulfilment.91 
However, it is possible that some conduct does not constitute expression 
and so is not protected by the right to freedom of expression contained in 
the BORA. For example, in Canada violence as a form of expression is not 
protected,92 and in Germany expression that combats the free democratic 
basic order is not protected by the freedom of expression93 . 
In New Zealand, freedom of expression is not absolute but "intrinsically 
limited in certain ways. "94 In Solicitor General v Radio NZ Ltd the Court 
endorsed the Canadian approach that protects all expression, except 
violence, that conveys, or attempts to convey, meaning. 95 However, the 
Court held that the right to freedom of expression was necessarily limited 
by the right to a fair and impartial trial because it is "at least as fundamental 
and as important as the right to freedom of speech."96 It is unclear at what 
point violence, or threats of violence, fall outside the protective scope of the 
right to freedom of expression.97 
It is unclear why the consideration of competing rights, such as the right to 
a fair and impartial trial or the right to be free from coercion or violence, 
should take place at the definitional stage and not through the rubric of 
section 5. As already argued, the very existence of the section 5 general 
9 1 Human self-fulfilment is one of the three main justifications given for the freedom of 
expression. See ibid, 309; Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General (Quebec), above n 89, para 
54 (SCC) Dickson CJ, Lamer and Wilson JJ. 
92 Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General (Quebec), above n 89, para 43 (SCC) Dickson CJ, 
Lamer and Wilson JJ. ' 
93 Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, article 18. 
94 Solicitor General v Radio NZ Ltd [ 1994] I NZLR 48, 59 (HC). 
95 Ibid, 59-60 (HC). See also New Zealand Ministry of Justice "The Guidelines on the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the Rights and Freedoms in the Bill of 
Rights Act for the Public Sector" (November 2004) <www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 
7 July 2009). 
96 Solicitor General v Radio NZ Ltd, above n 94, 59-60 (HC) . 
97 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill (20 February 2008) 3. 
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limitation provision suggests that limitations on rights and freedoms should 
not be addressed at the definitional stage. 
98 
The following section considers whether the display of gang insignia falls 
within the protective scope of the right to freedom of expression. 
2 Does the display of gang insignia fall within the protective scope of 
the right to freedom of expression? 
Bishop argues that gang insignia should not fall within the protective scope 
of the right to freedom of expression because they constitute threats of 
violence, and generally undermine the principles of freedom of 
expression. 99 Bishop argues that gang insignia intimidate and are 
intimately connected to violence. Gang insignia therefore represent threats 
of violence and force people to "alter how their lives are lived,"
100 
undermining their freedom of action. Gang insignia undermine the 
principles of freedom of expression. According to Bishop, gang insignia 
contribute to little to the marketplace of ideas, signify the rejection of 
democracy because they represent an endorsement of violence, and 
preclude a tolerant and welcoming environment for the realisation of 
individual self-fulfilment.
101 
Support for the argument that gang insignia should not fall within the 
protective scope of the freedom of expression because they constitute 
threats of violence can be found in the United States Supreme Court case of 
Virginia v Black.
102 In that case the United States Supreme Court held that 
cross burning done with intent to intimidate did not attract the protection of 
the freedom of expression because such behaviour constituted a "true 
98 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, above n 85, 316. 
99 
Christopher B ishop Fashion Tips for Liberals : Gang Patches, Public Places, and Freedom 
of Expression (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington , 2007) 15. 
Bishop refers to gang patches, not gang insignia, retlecting the wording of the proposed 
prohibition at the time of his writing. 
IOO Ibid, 16-17. 
IOI Ibid, I 9. 
102 Virginia v Black (2003) 538 US 343 . 
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threat". 103 ""True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker 
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals."104 
In the United States, cross burning done with intent to intimidate poses a 
true threat because cross burnings are inextricably intertwined with the 
"long and pernicious" history of the Ku Klux Klan as a lawless and, even, a 
terrorist organisation. 105 The majority in Virginia v Black held that 
intimidation is a "type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a 
person with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death." 106 " [T]he Klan used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a 
threat of impending violence."107 These threats carried "special force" due 
to the Klan ' s long history of violence, 108 so that "when a cross burning is 
used to intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful." 109 For 
example, one woman stated that "the burning cross symbolized to her as a 
black American: 'murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just about anything bad 
that you can name ... '" 11 0 
A similar argument is made in support of the Wanganui prohibition. 111 
Chester Borrows MP argued that "[g]ang members have raped, murdered, 
beaten, and stolen in gang regalia with no hesitation, and they have shown 
no remorse .. . their behaviour. . . has instilled reasonable fear in the minds of 
average Kiwis .. . " 112 Therefore, it is arguable that the public display of 
gang insignia, because of the pernicious history of gangs in New Zealand, 
does express an intent to commit acts of unlawful violence on members of 
the public. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, 359-60. 
!OS Ibid, 352-360. 
106 Ibid, 360. 
107 Ibid, 354. 
108 Ibid, 355 . The majority judgment's description of Klan violence includes incidents of 
murder, flogging, and tar-and-featherings [at 354], bombings, beatings, shootings, 
stabbings and mutilations [at 355). 
109 Ibid, 357. 
I IO Ibid, 390-391. 
11 1 C Borrows (6 May 2009) 654 NZPD 2945. 
11 2 C Borrows (16 April 2008) 646 NZPD 15756. 
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Bishop's argument that gang insignia should not attract the protection of the 
freedom of expression relies on the assumption that the display of gang 
insignia necessarily intimidates and therefore undermines the principles of 
freedom of expression. The pernicious history of gangs supports this 
assumption. The problem with this argument is not that intimidating or 
violent expression should fall outside the protection of freedom of 
expression, but that the display of gang insignia is regarded as necessarily 
intimidating. 
In Virginia v Black the majority of the United States Supreme Court held 
that a cross burning does not necessarily intimidate as the Ku Klux Klan 
also used cross burnings as a potent symbol of shared group identity and 
ideology. 11 3 The Supreme Court recognised that a prohibition of all cross 
burnings, regardless of whether the actor intended to intimidate, failed to 
distinguish between the different types of cross burnings and so prohibited 
innocent and legitimate expression. However, because the prohibition in 
Virginia v Black required an intent to intimidate it constituted a true threat 
and was justifiably prohibited. 
It is hard to accept that the display of gang insignia in a positive context, 
such as a patched gang member fishing with his partner and child, 
114 
expresses an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. The Wanganui 
prohibition applies to all display of gang insignia regardless of whether the 
displayer intended to intimidate or not. The display of gang insignia might 
well be done with intent to intimidate and constitute a true threat. 
However, gang insignia may also be displayed as an expression of 
membership and identity. Therefore, the prohibition fails to distinguish 
between the different types of display. 
Bishop concedes that although "a bare gang patch, by itself, means very 
little ... the demeanour and the behaviour of the wearer affect the message 
11 3 Virginia v Black, above n 102, 356-7. 
11 4 Rob Vincent, above n 31. 
29 
transmitted." 115 Therefore, it is the form of express10n that justifies 
excluding the content of expression from the protection of the freedom of 
expression. 
Under this argument, gang insignia should only be excluded from the 
protective scope of the freedom of expression when the form is violent, 
threatening or undermines the principles of freedom of expression. 
However, the prohibition of the display of gang insignia extends to all 
display of gang insignia, including situations where the form of expression 
is peaceful. If the bare gang patch means very little and the display is 
peaceful then there is no justification, under Bishop's argument, to exclude 
the display of gang insignia from the protective scope of the freedom of 
expression. 
A true threat is not simply a threat of impending violence for the individual 
or group at which the burning is targeted. It is also a threat "directed to the 
national identity, to the country's sense of itself as a liberal, tolerant society 
that has put the period of Klan terror behind it."116 A true threat must 
resonate with the relevant political climate. 11 7 For example, Nazi 
expression does not constitute a true threat in the United States because the 
threat of nazism does not draw upon a long and pernicious history of that 
country and so does not resonate with the political climate of the United 
States. 11 8 
Gangs in New Zealand may well have a pernicious history and be involved 
in lawless activity. However, as general criminal organisations gangs are 
different to the morally repugnant Ku Klux Klan or Nazi groups. Gangs do 
not threaten a country's identity as a liberal, tolerant society in the same 
way as racial or genocidal terrorists. 
11 5 Christopher Bishop, above n 99, 15 . 
11 6 Robert A Kahn "Cross-Burning, Holocaust Denial, and the Development of Hate 
Speech Law in the United Sates and Germany" (2006) 83 U Det Mercy L Rev 163, 180. 
11 7 Ibid, I 80. 
11 8 However, see Richard L Wiener & Erin Richter "Symbolic Hate: Intention to 
Intimidate, Political Ideology, and Group Association" (2008) 32 Law & Hum Behav 463 ; 
Alexander Tsesis "Regulating Intimidating Speech" (2004) 41 Harv Jon Legis 389. 
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Parliament has clearly decided that the display of gang insignia does not 
pose a true threat to the national identity. If the display of gang insignia did 
pose such a threat then the prohibition would have been enacted nationwide 
rather than only in Wanganui. Furthermore, gangs have not been 
criminalized and membership to a gang is not illegal. Therefore, expressing 
membership to a gang, the content of the message conveyed by the display 
of gang insignia, is not illegal. Such expression of identity should attract 
the protection of free speech unless the form of expression contravenes 
existing law. 
The display of gang insignia itself does not intimidate or constitute a true 
threat. It is the form of the display and not the content of the gang insignia 
that may intimidate or threaten. Therefore the display of gang insignia falls 
within the protective scope of the freedom of expression. The PGI Act is 
apparently inconsistent with the freedom of expression by prohibiting the 
display of gang insignia. It is therefore necessary to consider whether such 
limitation is justified in terms of section 5 of BORA. 
D Is the Wanganui Prohibition a Justified Limitation on the 
Freedom of Expression? 
I The law 
Section 5 of the BORA states: 
... the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 
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In the leading New Zealand case of Hansen v R the Supreme Court held 
that the inquiry under section 5 is essentially "whether a justified end is 
achieved by proportionate means." 119 
Drawing on the leading Canadian case of R v Oakes, Tipping J concluded 
that whether a limitation is justified under section 5 requires addressing the 
following questions: 120 
(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom? 
(b) (i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is 
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective? 
2 Sufficiently important purposes 
The purposes of the prohibition of the display of gang insignia are to 
prevent or reduce intimidation of members of the public by gang members 
and to avoid or reduce gang confrontation. The purpose of the prohibition 
is not to solve the total gang problem as it exists in Wanganui. 121 These 
goals are sufficiently important to warrant the existence of laws 
criminalising both intimidation and the use of violence. 122 The prevention 
of criminal activity is important. Further, members of the public should be 
able to "go about their business without fear or trepidation." 123 
The Attorney-General found that the objectives of the Wanganui 
prohibition are sufficiently important and significant to justify limiting the 
119 Hansen v R, above 72, para 123 Tipping J. See also, Hansen v R, above 72, para 42 
Elias CJ; paras 63-66 Blanchard J; paras 203-205 McGrath J; para 272 Anderson J. 
120 Ibid, para 103-104 (SC) Tipping J. 
121 (4 March 2009) 652 NZPD 1642. 
122 See above discussion on the existing statutory framework at III C. 
123 (16 April 2008) 646 NZPD 15764. 
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freedom of expression because they seek to protect public order.
124 Under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, affirmed by the 
BORA, the protection of public order justifies limiting the right to freedom 
of expression. 12
5 
The W anganui prohibition was initially advanced by the Council as a by law 
under section 145 of the Local Government Act 2002. 
126 This section gives 
the Council authority to make bylaws for the purposes of protecting the 
public from nuisance; protecting, promoting, and maintaining public health 
and safety; and minimising the potential for offensive behaviour in public 
places.127 The purposes of the Wanganui prohibition are sufficiently 
important to permit the making of a bylaw. This suggests that the purposes 
also justify limiting the right to freedom of expression. 
3 Rational connection 
The limitation that the prohibition of the display of gang insignia places on 
the right to freedom of expression is not rationally connected to 
prohibition' s purposes. 
First, as discussed above, the evidence relied on to establish the perceived 
harm of gang violence and public intimidation does not show any 
connection between the display of gang insignia and the harm. The police 
statistics relied on to show the need for a prohibition of gang insignia 
focussed on gang related incidents of a public nature.
128 The display of 
gang insignia was not specifically considered in the data. Therefore, while 
the data showed a concerning level of gang violence it did not show that the 
display of gang insignia was in any way connected to this. This lack of 
evidence of a connection between the display of gang insignia and the 
124 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill (20 February 2008) 3. 
125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 19(3). 
126 Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Meeting of the Extraordinary Meeting of 
the Wanganui District Council" (10 March 2006), above n 35, 1860. 
127 Local Government Act 2002, s 145. 
128 "Gang OIA - Response", above n 22. 
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perceived harm suggests that prohibiting the display of gang insignia may 
not affect the level of public intimidation or gang confrontations. 
Second, the Wanganui prohibition does not directly prohibit the offending 
behaviour of public intimidation or violent gang confrontations. Existing 
law already directly addresses public intimidation and violent 
confrontation. It is therefore unnecessary for the PGI Act to explicitly do 
so too. The Attorney-General, in his report to parliament on the PGI Bill's 
consistency with the BORA, accepted that "gang insignia may itself convey 
a message of intimidation."129 However, because the prohibition did not 
directly prevent intimidating behaviour he held that the connection between 
the prohibition and the purpose of reducing intimidation was "tenuous". 130 
Despite a lack of direct connection, the Wanganui prohibition is rationally 
connected to its purposes if, by prohibiting the display of gang insignia, 
public intimidation and gang confrontation are reduced. 
The problem is that gang insignia do not intimidate, nor are they violent. 
While the purposes of the Wanganui prohibition are concerned with action 
and behaviour detrimental to public order, the limitation on the right to 
freedom of expression is not. Labour MP Grant Robertson argued that "the 
patches that gang members wear do not commit crime. The patches do not 
h . 1 . . h 1 "131 perpetrate t e VIO ence, It IS t e peop e. The Honourable Michael 
Cullen described the PGI Bill as "purely cosmetic". 132 The Wanganui 
prohibition does not regulate behaviour, but appearance. It does not 
prohibit public intimidation and violent gang confrontation but the display 
of gang insignia. 
Supporters of the prohibition argue that the "mere act of wearing patches 
intimidates others; and by wearing their patches, [gang members] are acting 
129 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill (20 February 2008) 4. 
130 Ibid. 
131 G Robertson MP (4 March 2009) 652 NZPD 1649. 
132 Ibid, 1658. 
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m a confrontational and provocative way to other gangs and to other 
people." 133 Under this view, if the display of gang insignia is prohibited 
then, consequently, intimidation and confrontation will be reduced. 
This author has trouble accepting that the mere display of gang insignia 
intimidates.1
34 It is the behaviour or conduct of the displayer that 
intimidates. If someone is gaily strolling down the street, singing out-loud, 
they are hardly likely to intimidate members of the public even if they are 
visibly wearing a gang patch. If that same person is barging down the 
footpath, pushing past people, audibly swearing, they are likely to 
intimidate nearby members of the public even if they are not visibly 
wearing any gang insignia. This example shows that it is not the display of 
gang insignia that intimidates but the behaviour of the displayer. For this 
reason, this author holds that the display of gang insignia is not rationally 
connected to the purpose of reducing or preventing public intimidation by 
gang members. 
Supporters of the prohibition argue that prohibiting the display of gang 
insignia will reduce gang violence. The explanatory note to the PGI Bill 
stated that gang insignia are the principal means of identifying members of 
different gangs and therefore contribute to, and promote, gang 
confrontations. 
135 On this basis, the Attorney-General conceded that 
prohibiting the principal means of identifying rival gang members would 
lead to a reduction in the likelihood of gang confrontations.
136 
However, gang members in Wanganui know who the members of other 
gangs are. They do not need gang patches to identify rival gang 
members. 
137 As a means of identification, the prohibition of gang insignia 
will not reduce, and is therefore not rationally connected to, gang violence. 
133 Ibid, 1655 . 
134 See above discussion at IV C 2. 
135 Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill 2007, no 171-1 
(Explanatory Note) 1. 
136 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill (20 February 2008) 3-4. 
137 K Locke MP (6 May 2009) 654 NZPD 2953 . 
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Supporters also argue that prohibiting the display of gang insignia removes 
the confrontational and provocative manner of gang insignia that "tips wary 
aggression over into violence." 138 The display of gang insignia inflames 
situations where members from different gangs cross paths. The 
prohibition will remove this inflammatory element. This author accepts 
that, in certain situations, the display of gang insignia is provocative and 
promotes the likelihood of gang confrontations. However, the display of 
gang insignia does not increase the likelihood of gang confrontation when 
no members of other gangs are present. Therefore, as with the purpose of 
reducing public intimidation, the connection between the Wanganui 
prohibition and the purpose of reducing the likelihood of gang 
confrontation is, at best, tenuous. 
This author believes that it is the behaviour of the displayer, and not the 
mere display of gang insignia, that intimidates or increases the likelihood of 
gang confrontation. The Wanganui prohibition does not prohibit public 
intimidation or gang confrontation. For these reasons, the author believes 
that the Wanganui prohibition is not rationally connected to its purposes. 
Even if it is accepted that the mere display of gang insignia intimidates and 
provokes gang confrontation, regardless of the displayer's behaviour, it 
does not necessarily follow that prohibiting the display of gang insignia will 
prevent intimidation and gang confrontation. The prohibition does not 
address intimidation or provocation of gang confrontation but simply one 
means by which these harms are believed to occur. Therefore, these harms 
may increase or reduce independently of the display of gang insignia. 
Furthermore, accepting that the mere display of gang insignia intimidates 
and provokes gang confrontation does not support an overall finding that 
the Wanganui prohibition is a proportionate means to reduce or prevent 
public intimidation and violent gang confrontation. The prohibition is a 
138 Christopher Bishop, above n 99, 31 . 
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greater limitation on the freedom of expression than necessary to achieve 
the purpose. 
4 Minimum impairment 
The prohibition of the display of gang insignia limits the right to freedom of 
expression more than is reasonably necessary to sufficiently achieve the 
prohibition ' s purposes. 
In Virginia v Black the United States Supreme Court emphasised the 
importance of content neutrality.
139 Content neutrality requires that any 
restriction on the freedom of expression must not be made on the basis of 
content. 140 In an earlier case the Supreme Court had held that a law 
prohibiting cross burning that would arouse "anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" was 
unconstitutional for lack of content-neutrality.
141 A cross burning that 
aroused anger, alarm or resentment in others on a basis other than race, 
colour, creed, religion or gender was not prohibited. The law was not 
content neutral and therefore unjustifiably limited the freedom of 
expression. 
The concept of content neutrality highlights the arbitrary nature of the 
Wanganui prohibition and shows that the Wanganui prohibition will not 
sufficiently achieve its purpose of preventing or reducing public 
intimidation and violent gang confrontation. Because intention to 
intimidate is irrelevant, the application of the Wanganui prohibition 1s 
determined by the definition of gang insignia. Only the insignia of the 
listed gangs are prohibited. The display of gang insignia, not covered by 
the PGI Act and Bylaw, is not prohibited even if done with intent to 
139 Virginia v Black, above n 102, 360-363. 
140 Robert A Kahn, above n 116, "Cross-Burning, Holocaust Denial , and the Development 
of Hate Speech Law in the United Sates and Germany" (2006) 83 U Det Mercy L Rev 163, 
172. 
141 RAV v City of St. Paul ( 1992) 505 US 377. 
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intimidate. Therefore, the Wanganui ban is not neutral because it only 
applies to the display of a subset of gang insignia. 
The connection between the prohibition and the purpose of reducing public 
intimidation is at best tenuous. Reducing public intimidation is not 
guaranteed, because the prohibition only prohibits the display of some 
gangs' insignia, and not intimidating behaviour. Therefore, the limitation 
on the right to freedom of expression, incurred by the prohibition, does not 
sufficiently achieve the reduction in public intimidation and impairs the 
freedom of expression more than necessary. 
Similarly, whether each display of gang insignia actually promotes the 
likelihood of gang confrontation is irrelevant. While the prohibition of the 
display of gang insignia removes a potentially inflammatory factor in gang 
confrontation, it does not guarantee the objective of reducing gang 
confrontation. The limitation of the right to freedom of expression, 
incurred by the prohibition of the display of gang insignia, is more than 
reasonably necessary because a reduction in gang confrontation is not 
guaranteed. The display of gang insignia, not covered by the PGI Act and 
Bylaw, is not prohibited even if done with intent to promote violent gang 
confrontation. 
Content neutrality also highlights the overly broad nature of the Wanganui 
prohibition. The Wanganui prohibition prohibits all display of gang 
insignia. It is irrelevant whether or not the displayer intends to intimidate 
and even whether or not the display does intimidate. The purpose of the 
prohibition is to remove intimidation, yet it will apply to non-intimidating 
display. Therefore, the Wanganui prohibition overly impairs the right to 
freedom of expression. 
5 Proportionate limitation 
The Wanganui prohibition disproportionately limits the right to freedom of 
expression in light of the prohibition' s purposes. 
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As already argued, there is no rational connection between the prohibition 
and the prevention of public intimidation and gang confrontation and the 
achievement of the purposes is not guaranteed. Therefore the limitation on 
the right to freedom of expression is disproportionately high. 
Even if the purposes of the W anganui prohibition are the mere reduction in 
public intimidation and gang confrontation, the prohibition of the display of 
gang insignia is still a disproportionate limitation on freedom of expression. 
The purposes could be achieved by the smallest reduction in public 
intimidation or gang confrontation. However, limiting the freedom of gang 
members to express their identity as a member of a group is too great a 
measure to achieve the smallest reduction of public intimidation and gang 
confrontation. This is even more so when public intimidation and gang 
confrontation were already covered by existing laws. The limitation on the 
freedom of expression comes at no real gain and is therefore 
disproportionately large compared to the importance of the objective. 
6 Summary 
The Wanganui prohibition is an unjustified limitation on the right to 
freedom of expression. Even if the Wanganui prohibition is rationally 
connected to its purposes it is a disproportionate limitation on freedom of 
expression and more than necessary to achieve its purposes. 
Section 4 of the BORA requires the natural meaning of the prohibition to be 
adopted and applied, even though it is an unjustified limitation on the 
freedom of expression, unless section 6 permits the adoption of a meaning 
that is more consistent with freedom of expression. 
E Is A More Consistent Meaning Available? 
Section 6 of the BORA requires that the prohibition of the display of gang 
insignia be given such tenable meaning that is most consistent with the right 
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to freedom of expression. Only a tenable meaning can be given to an 
enactment. However, it is not always easy to determine whether a meaning 
is tenable or not. Further, it is unclear whether section 6 requires 
interpreting the prohibition in such a way as to provide the least possible 
limitation, or the least possible, reasonable limitation. 
1 Tenable meaning 
Section 6 does not require adopting the most BORA-consistent meaning. 
Rather, it requires adopting the most BORA-consistent meaning that can be 
given to the enactment. The meaning adopted under s 6 must be a tenable 
interpretation of the enactment. 
Courts can read in to legislation qualifications and modifications that are 
. . h fu d l . h 142 consistent wit n amenta ng ts. In Quilter v Attorney-General 
Thomas J said that "even if a meaning is theoretically possible, it must be 
rejected if it is clearly contrary to what Parliament intended." 143 However, 
Parliament is presumed to legislate consistently with fundamental rights 
unless the legislation clearly suggests otherwise. The BORA itself is 
evidence of Parliament's intent to legislate consistently with fundamental 
rights. "In that way the Bill of Rights can be conceived as a delegation of 
authority [to the courts] to read down and read in where this would not be 
inconsistent with legislative purpose." 144 
In so doing courts walk a fine line between legitimate judicial interpretation 
and illegitimate legislative amendment. According to Rishworth, this line 
is crossed in two situations. First, judicial interpretation is inappropriate 
where it amounts to the "implementation of policy choices that should 
142 Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
2003) 148 & 152. 
143 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523, 541 (CA) Thomas J. 
144 Paul Rishworth, above n 142, 164. 
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properly be left to the legislature."
145 Second, it is inappropriate where the 
adopted meaning would "defeat the accepted purpose of the enactment."
146 
The natural meanmg of the W anganui prohibition provides a strong 
limitation on the freedom of expression because it applies to all display of 
gang insignia, regardless of whether the gang insignia is displayed to 
intimidate and provoke gang confrontation, or as peaceful expression of 
identity. The issue is whether it is tenable to give the prohibition a meaning 
that is more consistent with the freedom of expression than the natural 
meaning, and yet does not defeat the accepted purpose of the prohibition. 
It is not tenable to give the Wanganui prohibition a meaning that does not at 
all limit the freedom of expression. The very purpose of the prohibition is 
to prevent or reduce public intimidation and avoid or reduce gang 
confrontation by prohibiting the display of gang insignia. Therefore, to not 
defeat this accepted purpose the meaning must be interpreted to at least 
prohibit intimidating or provocative display of gang insignia. Such a 
meaning still provides some limitation, albeit to a lesser extent, on the 
freedom of expression. 
The Wanganui prohibition can be read down to the display of gang insignia 
that intimidates or promotes confrontation due to section 5(5) of the PGI 
Act. Section 5(5) informs that the purpose of the Wanganui prohibition is 
to prevent or reduce the likelihood of intimidation or harassment of 
members of the public in a specified place or to avoid or reduce the 
potential for confrontation by, or between, gangs. To limit the prohibition 
to the display of gang insignia that intimidates or promotes confrontation 
promotes both the purposes of the Wanganui prohibition and BORA 
compliance. Such a reading more closely attaches the prohibition to the 
harm it seeks to remedy, and thus respects the purpose of the prohibition. 
Such a reading is also more consistent with the freedom of expression 
145 Ibid, 149. 
146 Ibid, 149. 
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because it does not prohibit innocent expression that does not intimidate or 
promote confrontation. 
It must be noted that section 5(3) of the PGI Act removes the necessity for 
the Council to consider BORA consistency when making a bylaw under 
section 5. Section 5(3) requires the Council to follow sub-sections 83(a) 
and (b) of the Local Government Act 2002 (the LGA), relating to the 
necessary elements of the statement of proposal, when making a bylaw 
under the PGI Act. However, section 5(3) does not require the Council to 
follow section 83(c) of the LGA which, via section 155, requires a bylaw to 
be consistent with the BORA. 147 The requirement of BORA consistency in 
section 155 of the LGA only applies to bylaws made under the LGA and so 
does not apply to bylaws made under the PGI Act. 
The non-application of the BORA to the Council's bylaw making powers 
under the PGI Act was recognised by Wanganui mayor Michael Laws: 
"Parliament ha[s] expressly given the council power to impose the gang 
patch ban. This include[s] putting aside the Bill of Rights Act."148 
However, to hold that the Council does not have to consider BORA 
implications when making bylaws under the PGI Act, does not mean that 
the Wanganui prohibition itself does not have to comply with the BORA. It 
may be that the Council was exempted by Parliament from complying with 
the BORA because the principal Act had already been subjected to BORA 
scrutiny by Parliament. However, the exemption of the Council from 
considering the BORA when making a bylaw under the PGI Act does not, 
and can not, prevent a BORA challenge against the Wanganui prohibition. 
Section 6 of the BORA therefore still applies to the Wanganui prohibition 
and permits reading down the prohibition to provide a meaning that 
147 However, the Council's statement of proposal for the draft by law did consider, albeit 
superficially, BORA implications : Draft Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang 
Insignia) Bylaw 2009 (Statement of Proposal) <www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 28 
July 2009). 
148 "Hell's Angels ' gang patch objections to be heard" (28 July 2009) Press Release 
<www.wanganui .govt.nz> (last accessed 25 August 2009). 
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respects both the purpose of the Wanganui prohibition and Parliament's 
intent to legislate consistently with the right to freedom of expression. This 
is achieved by reading the prohibition as applying to the display of gang 
insignia that intimidates or provokes confrontation. 
A question remains whether section 6 permits reading down the prohibition 
to apply only to the display of gang insignia that intimidates or promotes 
confrontation, or whether section 6 permits reading in a further requirement 
that the displayer must intend to intimidate or promote confrontation. 
Requiring intent provides less limitation on the freedom of expression 
because the display of gang insignia that intimidates or promotes gang 
confrontation would no be prohibited if the displayer did not intend to do 
so. However, reading in a requirement of intent may defeat the purpose of 
the prohibition and therefore not be tenable. 
2 Can intent be read in? 
This section discusses the different approaches taken in the United States 
and New Zealand to whether intent is required for the freedom of 
expression to be justifiably limited. 
(a) The United States approach 
In Virginia v Black the United States Supreme Court held that an intent to 
intimidate is necessary to justifiably limit the freedom of expression in 
cases of intimidating expression. 149 In that case a Virginia statute that 
prohibited cross burning justifiably limited the freedom of expression 
because the prohibition only applied to those cross burnings done with the 
intent to intimidate. 
A majority of the United States Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment right to the freedom of expression permits prohibiting this 
149 Virginia v Black, above n 102. 
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subset of intimidating expression because cross burning is a "particularly 
virulent form of intimidation" due to its "long and pernicious history as a 
signal of impending violence."150 
However, the majority held that a cross burning does not necessarily 
intimidate because the Klan also used cross burnings as a potent symbol of 
shared group identity and ideology. 151 Therefore, it was essential that the 
ban was limited to those cross burnings done with intent to intimidate. 
Prohibiting all cross burnings would unjustifiably limit legitimate forms of 
expression and would amount to suppressing mere distasteful ideas. 152 
However, the Virginia statute went on to provide that: 153 
[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons. 
This pnma facie evidence prov1s1on was unconstitutional because it 
allowed for the possibility that cross burning that is not done with the intent 
to intimidate, but as a statement of political ideology or group identity, may 
be caught. Therefore, the "provision chills constitutionally protected 
political speech because of the possibility that a State will prosecute- and 
potentially convict- somebody engagmg only m lawful political 
h ,, 154 speec .... 
The United States Supreme Court's finding that cross burning can only be 
prohibited, and the freedom of expression justifiably limited, where an 
intent to intimidate is present is significant for the Wanganui prohibition. 
The Wanganui prohibition prohibits all display of gang insignia and so fails 
to distinguish between the display of gang insignia that intimidates and the 
display, which is done as an expression of political ideology or group 
150 Ibid, 363. 
15 1 Ibid, 356-7. 
152 Ibid, 358. 
153 Va. Code Ann. §18.2-423 (1996). 
154 Virginia v Black, above n 102, 365. 
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identity. According to Virginia v Black, the Wanganui prohibition would 
not be a justified limitation of the freedom of expression. Therefore, as 
required by section 6, the meaning of the Wanganui prohibition should be 
read down to require intent on the part of the displayer in order to be more 
consistent with the freedom of expression. 
(b) The different freedoms of expression 
The freedom of expression guaranteed in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 155 is different to the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by section 14 of the BORA156 • The right to freedom of 
expression is dependent on context, and is determined by a country's 
history and experience. 157 
Freedom of expression in the United States receives a strong constitutional 
protection which is "seemingly unparalleled anywhere else in the world" 158 
and extends to protect "the kind of speech that most of the rest of the 
democratic world prohibits"159. Freedom of expression receives the 
strongest constitutional protection among the individual civil rights 
protected by the American Constitution, and "generally prevails over other 
democratic values, such as equality, human dignity, and privacy." 160 One 
author argues that the strong constitutional protection is due to the long 
history of constitutional litigation. 161 As the United States Supreme Court 
has, over the years, extended constitutional protection "for freedom of 
speech in one situation, that protection has been carried over to other 
situations implicating First Amendment rights." 162 
155 
The relevant text of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is, 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .. . ". 
156 
Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990 reads, "Everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information 
and opinions of any kind in any form." 
157 
Robert A Sedler "An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest 
of the World" (2006) Mich St L Rev 377, 378. 
158 Ibid, 380. 
159 Ibid, 377. 
160 Ibid, 379 & 383. 
16 1 Ibid, 377. 
162 Ibid, 380. 
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The context in New Zealand is different. Freedom of express10n 1s 
protected through legislation. In enacting the BORA Parliament was able 
to "balance and accommodate different individual rights, and to make value 
judgments as to appropriate limitations on particular individual rights."163 
Freedom of expression is not supreme law and does not prevail over other 
rights and freedoms as it does in the United States. 
In declining to give the overriding status of supreme Jaw to the local Bill of rights 
and enacting it instead as ordinary legislation, the New Zealand government was 
deliberately creating a fundamentally different arrangement from that of the 
United States. 164 
These differences make it dangerous to draw compansons between the 
freedoms of expression in the two countries. However, comparisons may 
be made when caution is exhibited. 
Where the relevant context (social, political, historical ... etc) is different 
between the two countries, an approach taken in one country may not be 
appropriate in the other. Furthermore, because freedom of expression is 
constitutionally protected in the United States, justifications for limiting 
freedom of expression must reach a higher threshold than in New Zealand. 
Therefore, expression that is not restricted in the United States may well be 
restricted in New Zealand. 
Due to these different freedoms of expression it is arguable that Victoria v 
Black sets the threshold too high to justifiably limit the right to freedom of 
expression in New Zealand. A requirement of intent may not be necessary 
in New Zealand. Consequently, prohibiting the display of gang insignia 
that intimidates, even where the displayer does not intend to intimidate, 
may justifiably limit the freedom of expression in New Zealand. 
163 Ibid, 380. 
164 Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech from the Bottom in Aotearoa: 
Subjectivity, Empathy, Cultural Difference" (2001) 9 Waikato L Rev 231, 240. 
46 
(c) The New Zealand approach 
In Brooker v Police the New Zealand Supreme Court held that intention is 
not a necessary element for the offences of disorderly behaviour and 
offensive behaviour under section 4(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981. 
However, the behaviour must cross an objective threshold and amount to 
more than mere annoyance. 
Behaviour constitutes disorderly behaviour if it disturbs or violates the 
public order. 165 Elias CJ held that: 166 
what is essential ... is that the behaviour is disruptive of public order and is not 
simply a private affront or annoyance to a person present or to whom the 
behaviour is directed . ... Whether behaviour is disorderly is not to be assessed 
against the sensibilities of individuals to whom the behaviour is directed or who 
are present to see and hear it, but against its tendency to disrupt public order. 
Similarly, offensive behaviour must "be capable of wounding feelings or 
arousing real anger, resentment, disgust or outrage in the mind of a 
reasonable person of the kind actually subjected to it in the circumstances in 
which it occurs."167 
The ~anganui prohibition does not explicitly address disorderly and 
offensive behaviour. However, by addressing public intimidation and 
violent gang confrontation it can be seen to address a subset of the 
behaviour addressed by the offences of disorderly and offensive behaviour. 
Both the Wanganui prohibition and the offences of disorderly and offensive 
behaviour are concerned with protecting public order. 168 
To be consistent with the offences of disorderly and offensive behaviour the 
display of gang insignia should, therefore, constitute an offence when such 
165 Brooker v Police, above n 57, para 56 (SC) Blanchard J. 
166 lbid, paras 33 & 41 Elias CJ. 
167 Ibid, para 55 Blanchard J. 
168 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill (20 February 2008) 3. 
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display is disruptive of public order, but not when it is merely annoying. 
The intent of the displayer is not relevant because the offence is measured 
by the expectations of a reasonable person to the "normal functioning of life 
in the environs of that place." 169 
The display of gang insignia that causes members of the public to feel 
intimidated and that promotes the potential for gang confrontation 
constitutes a "disruptive interference with the ordinary expectation of 
members of the public that they can enjoy amenities of their environment 
without disturbance." 170 Such behaviour is more than mere annoyance or 
an emotional disturbance. 
Where behaviour involves a genuine exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression then a higher threshold exists for the behaviour to constitute 
disorderly behaviour. 171 In determining whether behaviour constitutes 
disorderly behaviour the courts should "weigh the manner but not the 
content of the expression." 172 This suggests that where the display of gang 
insignia involves a genuine and peaceful exercise of expression of identity 
then it is unlikely to be held to disrupt the public order. However, the 
display of gang insignia, in an aggressive manner, as a tool of intimidation 
and would likely be disruptive of public order. 
Significantly, Elias CJ noted in Brooker that the offence of disorderly 
behaviour is capable of "significant impact upon important freedoms" 
because the power to arrest without warrant permits prior restraint of the 
freedom of expression. 173 She therefore held that "the freedom of speech 
should be restricted for reasons of public order only when there is a clear 
danger of disruption rising far above annoyance." 174 The significant impact 
on the freedom of expression did not mandate reading in a requirement of 
intent to disrupt public order. Rather, it simply raised the threshold to be 
169 Brooker v Police, above n 57, para 56 Blanchard J. 
170 Ibid, para 121 McGrath J. 
171 Ibid,, para 92 Tipping J. 
172 Ibid, para 61 Blanchard J. 
173 Ibid, para 34 Elias CJ. 
174 Ibid, para 42 Elias CJ. 
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met before the Court would be willing to find that the behaviour disrupted 
the public order. 175 
This argument also applies to the Wanganui prohibition. The PGI Act 
similarly permits arrest and seizure without warrant and so also permits 
prior restraint of the freedom of expression. Therefore, the display of gang 
insignia should only be prohibited, and the freedom of expression limited, 
where the display creates a clear danger of disruption rising far above 
annoyance. The risk of prior restraint does not necessitate a requirement 
of intent. The freedom of expression can be protected against the risk of 
prior restraint by raising the threshold to be met before finding that the 
public order has been disrupted. 
Brooker shows that what is important is whether public order is disrupted 
and not whether the accused intended to disrupt public order. This suggests 
that if the Wanganui prohibition can be read down, as per section 6 of the 
BORA, it is unnecessary to read in a requirement of intent, because what is 
essential is that the display of gang insignia disrupts public order by 
intimidating or promoting violent gang confrontation. Similarly to the 
offences of disorderly and offensive behaviour, intimidation would be 
measured against the objective expectations of a reasonable person in the 
context, not the subjective sensibilities of the alleged victim. 
A problem with this argument is that while the Wanganui prohibition and 
the offences of disorderly and offensive behaviour may address the same, or 
similar, behaviour they are found in two different legislative schemes. 
Therefore, the elements necessary for the offences of disorderly and 
offensive behaviour do not necessarily apply to the Wanganui prohibition. 
The offences of disorderly and offensive behaviour require showing that the 
accused has behaved in a disorderly, or offensive, manner. The Wanganui 
prohibition only requires showing that the accused displayed gang insignia 
in a specified place. That this behaviour may constitute public intimidation 
175 Ibid, para 59 Blanchard J. 
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amounting to disorderly behaviour 1s not relevant to establishing the 
offence. 
A further problem is that the Summary Offences Act 1981 specifically 
establishes an offence of public intimidation. 176 The offence requires the 
accused to have either intended to, or been reckless as to whether his or her 
conduct would, frighten or intimidate any other person. This is highlighted 
by the fact that Mr Brooker was initially arrested for intimidation but, as 
there was no evidence of an intent to intimidate, the charge was amended to 
one of disorderly behaviour. 177 This offence of public intimidation is more 
relevant to the Wanganui prohibition because it deals specifically with 
intimidating behaviour and not, the more general, disorderly behaviour. If 
any guidance can be taken from a different legislative scheme, as 
questioned in the above point, the intimidation offence suggests that 
intimidating behaviour should only constitute an offence where the accused 
intends to intimidate, or is reckless as to whether his or her behaviour 
intimidates. 
This argument relates to the purpose of reducing public intimidation. The 
other purpose of the Wanganui prohibition of avoiding or reducing gang 
confrontation is more analogous to the offence of disorderly behaviour and 
so may not require intent. 
(d) Summary 
The preceding discussion shows that it is unclear whether a requirement of 
intent could arguably be read in to the Wanganui prohibition. While the 
offences of disorderly and offensive behaviour suggest intent is 
unnecessary, the section 21 offence of intimidation in the Summary 
Offences Act 1981 suggests that intent is necessary. Victoria v Black 
suggests that intent is necessary in cases of intimidating expression. 
176 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 21. 
177 See Brooker v Police, above n 57, paras 16-17 Elias CJ. 
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However, due to the different contexts in the United States and New 
Zealand intent may not be required in New Zealand. 
If it fell to be decided, this author argues that the tenable meaning of the 
W anganui prohibition that is most consistent with the right to freedom of 
expression would prohibit the display of gang insignia where it intimidates 
or promotes confrontation. This meaning does not require intent on the part 
of the displayer and therefore prohibits behaviour, which the displayer did 
not intend to be intimidating or provocative. However, to require intent 
would frustrate the purposes of the Wanganui prohibition, as it would not 
prohibit the display of gang insignia that unintentionally intimidates or 
provokes gang confrontation. As Brooker emphasises, the essential point is 
that harm occurs not that the accused intended to do so. A person is not 
caught when the display is merely annoying, but only when it breaches the 
expectations of a reasonable person to the normal functioning of life in the 
environs of that place. Therefore, under this meaning, the prohibition only 
captures the display of gang insignia that has the potential to disrupt the 
public order through intimidation or confrontation. 
It would be justified in terms of section 5 of the BORA because it excludes 
innocent display from the prohibition, while still respecting the purpose of 
the pr:ohibition. The prohibition would only apply to display that 
intimidates or promotes confrontation. Therefore there would be a rational 
and proportionate connection between the prohibition and its purposes. 
There would be a direct link between the prohibition and the harm it seeks 
to address. 
An example of when the display of gang insignia may intimidate or 
provoke gang confrontation even though the displayer does not intend to do 
so would be the display by patched gang members passively observing a 
gang confrontation. Members of the public could justifiably feel 
intimidated by this display because of the directly associated gang 
confrontation, even though the individual displayer may not intend to 
intimidate. 
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However, as the remaining section points out, this argument over whether 
or not intent can be read in is a moot one. 
3 Least possible reasonable limitation 
In Moonen (No I) the Court of Appeal held that: 178 
if there are two tenable meanings, the one which is most in harmony with the Bill 
of Rights must be adopted .... An enactment which limits the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights should be given such tenable meaning and 
application as constitutes the least possible limitation. 
The Court of Appeal considered section 6 as sequentially prior to section 5. 
Under this approach the first step is to determine the tenable meaning that 
constitutes the least possible limitation of the BORA right or freedom, as 
per section 6. The second step is then to determine whether this least 
inconsistent meaning is a justified limitation of the BORA right or freedom, 
as per section 5. This approach promotes interpreting a provision in favour 
of fundamental rights and freedoms. 179 
In Moonen (No 2) the Court of Appeal was invited to revisit this finding 
and hold that "a Bill of Rights consistent interpretation is one which 
involves the least possible reasonable limitation on a Bill of Rights right or 
freedom, rather than the least possible limitation (my emphasis)."180 
However, due to the scope of the appeal the Court was not required to 
decide the issue. 
The majority of the Supreme Court in Hansen seems to support the notion 
that the BORA requires adopting the meaning that provides the least 
possible, reasonable limitation. According to the majority, section 5 is 
178 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (No 1), above n 72, para 16 Tipping J 
for the Court. 
179 Hansen v R, above n 72, para 6 Elias CJ. 
180 Moon en v Film and Literature Board of Review (No 2) , above n 72, para 12 Richardson 
P for the Court. 
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sequentially prior to section 6. Under this approach if the natural and 
intended meaning of a limiting measure is justified by section 5 the 
meaning is "not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights as envisaged bys 6." 181 
In such a situation, "section 5 has legitimised the inconsistency" 182 between 
the limiting measure and the BORA. Such a limitation is reasonable 
because it is justified. This approach respects Parliament's plenary 
lawmaking powers and "ability to legislate in terms which constitute a 
justified limit". 183 
It is clear from Hansen that if the natural and intended meaning is justified 
in terms of section 5, then this meaning satisfies section 6 and should be 
adopted. It is also clear that if the natural and intended meaning is not 
justified in terms of section 5, and no other meaning is tenable, then this 
meaning must nevertheless be adopted because of section 4. However, it is 
not clear what approach is to be taken in the situation where the natural and 
intended meaning is not justified in terms of section 5 and an alternative, 
less-inconsistent meaning is tenable that is, nevertheless, also unjustified in 
terms of section 5. While the alternative meaning must be "reasonably 
possible", 184 it is not clear whether the alternative meaning can only be 
adopted if it is justified in terms of section 5. That is, if section 6 is 
engaged does it mandate the adoption of a meaning that is neither intended 
nor justified? The judgment of Tipping J suggests that, where no meaning 
is available that is justified under section 5, the intended meaning should be 
adopted because Parliament's plenary lawmaking powers would be 
frustrated if section 6 requires the adoption of an unjustified and unintended 
meaning over the natural and intended meaning. 185 
While it is arguable that the Wanganui prohibition could tenably be 
interpreted to only apply to the display of gang insignia that intimidates or 
promotes gang confrontation, it is simply not possible to do so. Parliament 
181 Hansen v R, above n 72, para 60 Blanchard J. 
182 Ibid, para 90 Tipping J. 
183 Ibid, para 90 Tipping J. See also ibid, para 61 Blanchard J. 
184 Ibid, para 91 Tipping J. 
185 Ibid, paras 90-91 Tipping J. 
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has clearly determined that all display of gang insignia crosses the threshold 
from tolerable, and valid, behaviour to behaviour that should attract 
sanction. The offences in the Summary Offences Act 1981 of disorderly 
and offensive behaviour and intimidation criminalize behaviour when it 
crosses a certain threshold. In each case it must be proved that the 
behaviour crosses from the tolerable, and valid, to that which attracts 
sanction. The Wanganui prohibition, however, criminalizes all behaviour 
that constitutes the display of gang insignia. It does not have to be proved 
in each case that the display of gang insignia crosses the threshold from 
tolerable and valid behaviour to behaviour that should attract sanction 
because Parliament has already determined that all display of gang insignia 
be prohibited. 
Parliament has made a decision on the merits of the display of gang insignia 
that, as in the case of disorderly and offensive behaviour, is normally left to 
the courts to decide. This decision of Parliament must be respected and 
precludes interpreting the Wanganui prohibition differently, even though 
Parliament's intended meaning constitutes an unjustifiable limitation of the 
right to freedom of expression. 
It simply is not tenable to read a requirement of intimidation or provocation 
of gang confrontation in to the prohibition of the display of gang insignia. 
Such interpretation is consistent with the purposes of the Wanganui 
prohibition but amounts to legislative amendment, rather than judicial 
interpretation. Parliament has chosen not to directly prohibit the harmful 
conduct of intimidation and gang confrontation. Rather, it has chosen to 
prohibit the expression of gang insignia. In so doing, Parliament has 
determined that such expression does intimidate and promote gang 
confrontation. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 
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V CONCLUSION 
The Wanganui prohibition prohibits the display of gang insignia in 
specified public places in the Wanganui district. The purposes of the 
Wanganui prohibition are to reduce or prevent public intimidation and to 
reduce or avoid gang confrontation. It is not tenable to read down the 
prohibition so that it only applies to display of gang insignia that 
intimidates or promotes gang confrontation, or to display of gang insignia 
that is intended to do so. Such meanings are more consistent with the right 
to freedom of expression because they narrow the scope of the prohibited 
display, increasing the connection between remedy and harm. However, 
for the courts to interpret the Wanganui prohibition in these ways would 
override legislative intention. Parliament clearly intended the prohibition to 
apply to all display of gang insignia. Therefore, this meaning must be 
adopted and applied as required by section 4 of the BORA. 
This is so, despite the Wanganui prohibition constituting an unjustified 
limitation of the right to freedom of expression under section 5 of the 
BORA. The W anganui prohibition is, at best, only tenuously connected to 
its purposes because it does not prohibit the harm it seeks to remedy, but 
rather the display of gang insignia. The display of gang insignia may be 
used in particularly virulent cases of intimidation. However, the display of 
gang insignia does not necessarily intimidate nor promote gang 
confrontation. It is not the display of gang insignia, but the conduct of the 
displayer, that intimidates or promotes gang confrontation. The Wanganui 
prohibition is overbroad in its scope because it captures innocent expression 
that neither intimidates nor promotes gang confrontation. The W anganui 
prohibition fails to distinguish between the different types of display of 
gang insignia and so is a disproportionate limitation of the right to freedom 
of expression. This is especially so when the Wanganui prohibition does 
not guarantee achievement of its purposes and the harms of public 
intimidation and gang confrontation were already covered by legislation. 
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